Longest Hungarian word

July 23, 2008

While cleaning my room this evening, I came across a scrap of paper on which a friend of mine a couple years ago had written the longest word in Hungarian, namely, megszentségteleníthetetlenségeskedéseitekért. As you might imagine, this fact appears on various websites variably translated; according to this one, it means “for your constant mentioning of the fact that [a particular thing] is unprofanable,”  which I gather is correct, or at least more correct than the one I saw at Wikipedia that had something to do with “pretending to be strong”.

Unfortunately, it’s proving to be far more difficult to find out where this word is used in print.  My friend said something about it occurring in some medieval liturgy, which both sounds completely plausible and would account for the paucity of internet references.  Maybe I’ll run across it some day…


Freespeak & Newspeak

March 31, 2008

This post was brought on in part by some of the recent political debates about certain statements being “over the line” etc.

To piggyback on a point I once read regarding the contemporary loss of distinction between Patriotism and Nationalism and/Jingoism, I’ve been thinking on and off about what ever happened to the social category of “Taste”.  I suppose it’s kind of a pre-90’s mentality–you know, back when The Simpsons was considered edgy–but it seems to me that the realm of social meaning and valuation that “Taste” used to occupy has been carved up between radical Free Speech advocacy and PC Speech Restrictions, and that conceptually we’re a far poorer society as a result.

Briefly, as a working definition I understand the “Taste” to encompass the degree to which an actor frames his actions/utterances in accordance with the accepted social norms of the particular context of the action/utterance.  Radical Free Speech attacks this by claiming that social context should never impinge upon one’s right to express oneself however one wants wherever and whenever one wants, and PC Speech declares certain expressions and opinions as off-limits in any context.


Jive Iliad

March 29, 2008

Courtesy of Gizoogle, this ought to be worth a weekend of fun.  Check out “bootylicious Achilles“, which I’m sure is what Patroclus thought…


On a lighter note

March 23, 2008

I have long held that the plural of “Kleenex” should be “Kleenices”.


Less is more

January 2, 2008

 Having been a bit under the weather and blowing my nose raw lately, I was wondering just what the petroleum jelly I’ve been been putting on my nose was and where it came from.   So Wikipedia satisfied that curiousity…

…but down among the other uses for the product is listed “personal lubricant”…Ewww!

You know, it’s funny how these supposedly more tactful sexual circumlocutions in fact have a way of ratcheting up the smarm factor by a couple powers of 10.


Silly children’s question of the day

January 1, 2008

Why isn’t toothpaste made out of teeth?


It’s not what you say…

December 19, 2007

…it’s how you say it that counts. Apt advice from the Mediterranean ancients, who left us many examples of the consequences of not speaking correctly…or at least in the manner in which one’s audience would want one to speak.

I’m currently engaged in an intermittent discussion with Orwhalyus over at Works and Days on the origins of the medieval spellings michi and nichil for the classical mihi and nihil, (I’ve remarked on more than one occasion that all the evidence has probably already been compiled and the correct conclusions reached by some some late 19th Century German PhD candidate whose dusty thesis is currently rotting away under the stacks at Tübingen or Heidelberg. But that won’t stop us!) and the most recent exchange brought up Catullus 84 as an example of how you could be hammered in Ancient Rome for incorrect speech. That put me in the mind of one of the more entertaining episodes of early Roman history, namely, the origins of the Pyrrhic War. The following is from the Loeb translation of the Roman Antiquities of Dionysius of Halicarnassus:

Postumius was sent as ambassador to the Tarentines. As he was making an address to them, the Tarentines, far from paying heed to him or thinking seriously, as men should do who are sensible and are taking counsel for a state which is in peril, watched rather to see if he would make any slip in the finer points of the Greek language, and then laughed, became exasperated at his truculence, which they called barbarous, and finally were ready to drive him out of the theatre. As the Romans were departing, one of the Tarentines standing beside the exit was a man named Philonides, a frivolous fellow who because of his besotted condition in which he passed his whole life was called Demijohn; and this man, being still full of yesterday’s wine, as soon as the ambassadors drew near, pulled up his garment, and assuming a posture most shameful to behold, bespattered the sacred robe of the ambassador with the filth that is indecent even to be uttered.

When laughter burst out from the whole theatre and the most insolent clapped their hands, Postumius, looking at Philonides, said: “We shall accept the omen, you frivolous fellow, in the sense that you Tarentines give us what we do not ask for.” Then he turned to the crowd and showed his defiled robe; but when he found that the laughter of everybody became even greater and heard the cries of some who were exulting over and praising the insult, he said: “Laugh while you may, Tarentines! Laugh! For long will be the time that you will weep hereafter.” When some became embittered at this threat, he added: “And that you may become yet more angry, we say this also to you, that you will wash out this robe with much blood.” The Roman ambassadors, having been insulted in this fashion by the Tarentines both privately and publicly and having uttered the prophetic words which I have reported, sailed away from their city.

As soon as Aemilius, with the cognomen Barbula, had assumed the consulship, Postumius and those who had been sent with him as ambassadors to Tarentum arrived in the city, bringing no answer, to be sure, but relating the insults that had been offered them and exhibiting the robe of Postumius as proof of their story. When great indignation was shown by all, Aemilius and his fellow consul assembled the senate and considered what course they ought to take, remaining in session from early morning until sunset; and this they did for many days. The question was not whether the terms of peace had been violated by the Tarentines, since all were agreed upon that point, but when an army should be sent against them. For there were some who advised against undertaking this war as yet, while the Lucanians, the Bruttians, and the large and warlike race of Samnites were in rebellion and Tyrrhenia, lying at their very doors, was still unconquered, but only after these nations had been subdued, preferably all of them, but if that should not be possible, at least those lying eastward and close to Tarentum. But others thought the opposite course advisable, namely, not to wait for a moment, but to vote for war at once. When it was time for counting the votes, those in the latter group were found to be more numerous than those who advised postponing the war to another time. And the populace ratified the decision of the senate.

(XIX, 5-6)


I knew this would be a problem…

December 4, 2007

I clicked “Publish” on the previous post last night and was just getting into bed, when it struck me that the following sentence could not stand without further comment: “The spoken word is the ultimate Either/Or.”  You can’t just toss something off like that, at least not without mentioning Kirkegaard and somehow accounting for the patent problems of linguistic ambiguity in communication.

Anyway, I don’t have time this morning to go into it, but the tack I’ll stick with now is that I’m drawing a distinction between speech as an instrument for communication and speech as a definitive act.  Or to put it another way, I’ll posit a difference between “Language” on the one hand and “Speech” on the other…ok, now I’ve gone and done it…oh well, I’ve been meaning to review Saussure and Lacan anyway.  Stay tuned.


ἥκω γὰρ ἐς γῆν τήνδε καὶ κατέρχομαι.

December 1, 2007

The other day I arrived and returned to my high school to acquire a transcript. I also took the opportunity to reconnect with a number of my former teachers, some of whom I encountered serendipitously in hallways and classrooms. The whole experience impressed up me the major differences between my time in high school and in college.

In high school I felt whole, as it were, and I only returned to that cognizance of being after two arduously satisfying (or satisfyingly arduous) years out of the country. College, on the other hand, was a time of significant personal fragmentation for me. As look back, I realize that in my attempts to adapt myself to the social circumstances and cultural milieu of a northeastern liberal arts college, I ended up shattering my own personality by setting up multiple different relationships and personas that were collectively doomed to failure. In the lofty hopes of being able to experience all sides of the world, I tried to be everyone, but ended up being no one and destroyed (or almost destroyed) a number of friendships in the process.

At college I learned to think in polarities, as it were. This wasn’t a completely bad thing, mind you. After all, the ideology of opposed distinctions is one valid academic tool among many and has its uses. Unfortunately, I doubt it’s a very useful life philosophy for someone who likes to span various social categories.

In any event, revisiting my high school gave me a bit of an opportunity to wander around in the idea space of self-definition, specifically the question of how far one can push the limits of one’s identity in society without violating sensibilities, and whether or not this leads merely to a bland lowest common denominator. In other words, to what degree are we constrained to self-define always and only “against”, and if we attempt to reject this constraint, must that inevitably result in social dislocation?

Two further points: First, I’ve filed this under linguistics since it is at some level a matter of definitions and meanings. I suppose there’s some kind of fancy word for this type of psycho-sociological application…probably has the lexeme “-semi-” in it somewhere.

Second, the title quote is the 3rd line of Aeschylus’ Choephoroi; I’ve chosen Orestes as something of an avatar to this discussion for one main reason and two ancillary ones. The main reason is that I remembered the line as quoted in Aristophanes’ Batrachoi (1128), wherein Aeschylus defends himself against Euripides’ accusation of redundancy by claiming that by both “arriving” and “returning” Orestes alludes to two different aspects of his identity in coming to Thebes. Upon reflection, I felt something similar the other day at my high school.

As for the other two reasons, well…in considering options for a decent model for the discussion of the coherence of multiple aspects of one personality, the traditional “everyman” in Greek myth is Odysseus (cf. Joyce: “No-age Faust isn’t a man. But you mentioned Hamlet. Hamlet is a human being, but he is a son only. Ulysses is son to Laertes, but he is father to Telemachus, husband to Penelope, lover of Calypso, companion in arms of the Greek warriors around Troy and King of Ithaca. He was subjected to many trials, but with wisdom and courage came through them all. Don’t forget that he was a war dodger who tried to evade military service by simulating madness. He might never have taken up arms and gone to Troy, but the Greek recruiting sergeant was too clever for him and, while he was ploughing the sands, placed young Telemachus in front of his plough. But once at the war the conscientious objector became a Jusqu’auboutist [bitter-ender]. When the others wanted to abandon the siege he insisted on staying till Troy should fall”.) . But he’s a little *too* traditional for my purposes. Besides, he’s got Athena on his side, and that’s just not fair.

Moving on from Odysseus, one might consider Oedipus, especially given how all of us men are supposed to derive our problems from his…or at least we were at some point in the recent past. But again, he’s still too much of a ready-made archetype in that much of the action that set in motion the tragic sequence of events centered on him, by and large happened without his conscious knowledge. In other words, Oedipus is in some sense more the name of a social process than of an individual human being.

So instead, I thought I’d move on to Orestes. He doesn’t really get put up on the pedestal too often, even in spite of the fact that he’s such an important figure in the (drum roll) Oresteia. Moreover, Euripides’ play about him gets a lot of bad press. But when you get down to it, he doesn’t seem to have been anyone all too special. Just some guy trying to do the right thing in a tough situation. Maybe it wasn’t the best of ideas, avenging his father by killing his mother and all, but BAM…next thing he knows, the Furies are after him. Eventually, the story (as Aeschylus puts it) ends well with the establishment of a venerable social institution. Keep your fingers crossed for me, will you?


Set Theory in Action!

November 26, 2007

Did you notice that on the sidebar there’s a category for uncategorized posts?  Spin, Bertand Russell, spin!!!